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Abstract
Given the assumptions of rational choice, this essay explicates the distributive
consequences of different ethical positions and how the relationship between eth-
ics and distributions provides a rationale for a struggle for moral authority for the
purpose of procuring distributive shares. The argument provides a partial answer
to the question of why there is political struggle in all human societies. It is pre-
sented first by clarifying the relationship between individual acts and their dis-
tributive consequences in a hypothetical state where morals do not exist. Ethical
considerations is then introduced as a constraint on choice for the purpose of clari-
fying how different ethics alter individual utility functions and hence what acts
people choose to undertake. Subsequently the distributive consequences appear to
be variant under different ethical constraints.
Keywords: ethics, distributions, economic theory, moral theory, moral authority
Listof Figures
Figure 1 – Outcomes of Acts in an Edgeworth Box 16
Figure 2 – Allocations of Benefits with a Contract Curve 18
Contents
Introduction: The struggle for moral authority 4
Moral Authority and the Struggle for Distributive Shares 4
The Problem explained 4
The Purpose of the Essay 5
Methodological reflections 6
A Note on Notes 8
The Relationship Between Acts and Distribitions 9
The Amoral versus the Moral State 9
Acts and Social Acts in the Amoral State 11
A Theorectical Framework for measuring Distributive Consequences 14
The Relationship Between Ethics and Distributions 19
Ethics as constraints on Acts 19
Two Ethical Positions 20
The Ethical Positions and their Distributive Consequences 24
Conclusion 29
The argument reviewed 29
Summary 30
References 31
 5
Introduction: The Struggle for Moral
Authority
Moral Authority and the Struggle for Distributive
Shares
Why do people struggle for moral authority? It is perhaps the most fundamental of
all political questions. You think you are right, I think I’m right. You try to assert
your moral authority over me and I over you. It is the very background for poli-
tics. Social movements, political parties, special interest groups, individuals, all
have their ideas on the ideal society and the entire struggle of politics is arguably
about what ideal is the right one, what ideal that represents good society.
But why do people engage in this struggle? It is a question that is rarely stud-
ied—it is often just taken as a given in social science. It is more common to study
how this struggle for moral authority is conducted by various parties, what results
the struggle has and by what methods people assert moral authority. Occasionally,
a normative study surface which tries to determine what society ought to be. But
rarely is the question of why the struggle takes place tackled.
One can quickly think of several answers to the question. People want power,
or perhaps that it is human nature to want to be right, but these answers aren’t
very enlightening. Power, for instance, is for most people just a means to an end,
not an end itself. Saying that people want power just passes the question on to an-
other one—why do people want power?
The answer this essay proposes to the question of why people struggle for
moral authority is that there is a distinct relation between ethics and distributions
of social benefits. People have goals in life and in their relations with others they
try to procure the social benefits needed to fulfill them. A specific ethical belief
system implies, I will attempt to demonstrate, specific distributive norms with the
implication that whoever defines ethics also defines the social distribution of
benefits. Given certain assumptions about human behavior, namely those of ra-
tional choice perspective, moral authority will allow whoever holds it to alter so-
cial distributions to their own advantage.
The Problem Explained
The purpose of this section is let the reader get a quick sense about the ideas pre-
sented in this essay. It also functions as a general declaration of content and what
to expect in the pages to come. The concepts herein will of course be developed as
we go along.
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The basic idea here is rather simple. It is assumed then that people are rational
actors who make choices according to some set of preferences and these actions
have distributive consequences. We derive satisfaction, pleasure, or in the econo-
mist terminology, utility, from doing the things we choose to do. Whether it's a
trade of goods, of words, of compassion, of love, of whatever, benefits of some
kind are generated for the actor. The procurement of such benefits is taken to be
why we act in the first place. When people act in some interconnected manner,
that is, when the outcome of some action I do somehow, either directly or indi-
rectly, affects the actions, or the outcomes of your actions, there will be distribu-
tive consequences. Some benefits will go to me, some will go to you.1 The bene-
fits will be distributed between us in some fashion depending upon what kind of
acts we undertake and how we value the outcomes of such actions (cf Schotter,
2001; Rosen, 2002 on the simple exchange economy). Any act generates benefits,
and anytime more than one individual is involved acts have some distributive con-
sequence.
In all social groups there are some rules for what one may and may not do.
Every society has had some set of moral rules that delimits the array of actions
available to its individual members—no society has ever said that anything goes
under any circumstance (cf. Nozick, 2001:239). Enter ethics. The function of eth-
ics here is taken to be a provision of some schema for categorizing actions into
right and wrong, or good or bad, whichever term you prefer. Ethics are a schema
of some sort, possibly like ‘all acts with property ‘P’ are right’, where ‘P’ would
then be substituted for some moral principle. Perhaps it is ‘adherence to a set of
rights’, or ‘maximizing social utility’ or even ‘being commanded by X (for in-
stance, God or a dictator) (cf, Snare, 1992:5 et seq.). Ethics delimit the array of
normatively desirable actions in accordance with this moral principle, and since
actions result in different distributions, one may plausibly consider, it is argued in
this essay, that ethics have delimiting effects the array of desirable distributive
outcomes. Ethics can, in other words, be seen as some normative function for de-
sirable distributive outcomes.
But ethics don’t just come out of nowhere, of course. It is, at least to a nontriv-
ial extent, defined by ourselves. One political implication of this is that individu-
als (or groups of individuals) might engage in a competitive struggle for moral au-
thority since whoever comes out on top in such a struggle will see the social dis-
tribution of benefits swing in their favor (cf. Knight, 1992). In the language of the
economist, whoever defines the ethical foundation of a society will also define
that society’s social welfare function.2
1 Cf. the of the exchange economy in economic theory, i.e., the Edgeworth Box which is referred
to extensively in later sections of the essay (cf. Schotter, 2001; Rosen, 2002).
2 The Social Welfare Function is generally taken to be the aggregate of individual utility functions
and describes the demand for goods for the entire society as opposed to a single individual (cf.
Rosen, 2002:42): It might also be of interest to digest the massive literature on the problems of ag-
gregation from individual utility functions to a social utility function including Arrow’s famous
theorem (1951) and Sen’s writings on the possibility of social choice (Sen, 1997).
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The purpose of this essay
The breadth of this problem is daunting and cannot possibly be exhausted in a
single thirty-some page essay. Limitations will have to be made. On the one hand
we have the relationship between ethics and distributive consequences. This piece
is of course paramount—if we cannot sift out such a relationship the whole idea
that imposing moral authority in a social situation to alter distributive advantages
falls flat. There would be no problem. On either side of this centerpiece one may
discuss, among other things, the nature of rationality and what methods that are
used to enforce a particular morality. Granted, a possible relation between ethics
and distributive consequences does not mean that moral struggle for distributive
shares will automatically follow. If one whishes to be precise (and why should
one not) it only explicates a possible way for people to enforce their morality on
others. People could conceivably choose not to engage in moral struggle (assum-
ing it is a matter of conscious decision) despite having the opportunity to define
the ethics of their social group. The claim that they will do so is a consequence of
the rational actor perspective. However this assumption may be unraveled in thou-
sand and one ways, but the nature of rationality is beyond the scope of the essay.
On the other side one may whish to discuss the methods of how such struggle
may proceed. For instance, it is arguably so that in countries like Sweden, Den-
mark, Germany, The Untied Kingdom, to name a few, the massive labor move-
ments of the Twentieth Century could enforce moral authority by popularizing the
social democratic idea, by building massive corporatist social structures and so
on. Further one may discuss leadership issues, indoctrination, suasion, and theo-
ries about popular opinion etc. But these issues, however interesting are beyond
the scope of the essay. They are also studied much more often than the question of
why people struggle for moral authority
The purpose of the essay is then to explicate the relationship between ethics
and distributions of benefits, that is to say, how do ethics set the rules for what ac-
tions, and hence for what distributive consequences, are normatively desirable.
This centerpiece gets all the attention and all other considerations are left for fu-
ture essays (or for other researchers). The unraveling of this relation will be routed
via, first, a clarification about the distributive consequences of human interaction
in some (slightly artificial) environment where we hypothetically think away the
existence of morals. Then second via the introduction of ethics, defined as men-
tioned above, as some schema for categorizing human acts into good and bad, and
a discussion of how such ethics may alter distributive consequences of actions.
Two examples of ethical positions will be used to illustrate the different conse-
quences of acts under ethical restraints, namely a utilitarian and a libertarian po-
sition (a Nozickian libertarian position to be more precise) (Kymlicka, 1990;
Nozick, 1974).
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Methodological reflections
The first thing that should be mentioned is that this is not a study of normative
ethics, that is, it is not the purpose of this essay to provide answers to the question
of right and wrong, or in other terms, what ethics ought to be. The proper designa-
tion for this essay is rather something like ‘a framework for deciding the distribu-
tive outcomes of different ethical positions’. It is neither an attempt to determine
in detail what the distributive consequences of particular ethical positions are. The
examples used (e.g. Utilitarianism vs. Libertarianism) should not be viewed as
such—they are not exhaustive in any way—they should rather be viewed as illus-
trations to a general problem. This entire essay is general, not specific in what it
seeks to accomplish.
A few words ought to be said about the rational choice perspective, although I
assume that the reader is already familiar with it. The rational actor perspective
assumes that, most of the time, individuals are utility-maximizers. They choose
whatever action they expect to be most beneficial to themselves, given a set of
preferences. Most variants of rational actor perspectives assume that individuals
make choices about what actions to take against what he recognizes as the best
possible outcome. It does not matter how complex the decision is (in the most ba-
sic models), under certainty of information individuals can rank all alternatives in
order of preference and choose which ever benefits him the most; any pair of
choices for action A or B he can say whether A is better than B or vice versa. He
then chooses the highest ranked alternative (Ward, 2002; Schotter, 2001; Nichol-
son, 2002).
Individual choice is restrained by relative prices of goods in society, transac-
tion costs (the cost of contracting exchanges on a market), and technology (for in-
stance technology conveying information about choices) (Schotter, 2001). In
standard models such as the simplest economic models of indifference analysis or
the Marshall Demand Function, or for the First Welfare Theorem transaction
costs are assumed to be zero and technology such that there is perfect information.
No uncertainty exists that could potentially cloud the individual’s judgement (for
the Marshall Demand Function see Nicholson, 2002:10; for the see Rosen,
2002:38-40).
The essay is strictly heuristic theory—it is a model based on (both explicit and
implicit) assumptions about what benefits are, what ethics are etc., and no empiri-
cal observations about reality are made or analyzed. Statements that are made
ought to be interpreted against the background of the assumptions of the rational
choice perspective, not against (some notion of what is) the real world. Ethics, as
is the case with preferences in economic models, are decidedly difficult to ob-
serve, either directly by asking people what their ethical beliefs are, or indirectly
by studying people’s actions. People may not know their ethical beliefs, they may
not think about them very much if they do, they may analyze them in any precise
fashion. If they do know they may not be able to express their values with any
precision.3 They may even lie about them for one reason or other, say, if they feel
3 For those with an interest in the revelation of preferences see Nicholson (2002:138-139) about
revealed preference theory.
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that they have values that go against the grain of their community. This all makes
interpersonal comparisons very difficult. The concerns above I think warrants the
need for theory when analyzing problems of this kind.
Distributions of benefits face a similar problem. It is not obvious what consti-
tutes a benefit. This is possibly inter-relationally defined, only you can evaluate
what benefits a certain act (or interaction with someone else) produce for you, and
hence there exist the same problem as with values. There are the same problems
of precise revelation and definition and it is difficult to make interpersonal com-
parisons. Hence the essay is strictly of the ‘given that…such and such’-type.
I do whish to state that though reality does not factor in here, I believe that the
models are ultimately useful only if they can function as a proxy for reality—they
must possess some predictive capability. However, the testing this particular essay
against the harshness of reality is something I shall happily leave to someone else.
Finally, I should mention that the framework is reductionist in character. We’re
concerned with individuals and their choices in social circumstances, not aggre-
gates. The social situation in this essay is restricted to the two-person, two-good
case, from which it is possible to extrapolate to larger social contexts. I will how-
ever, not engage in aggregations.
A Note on Notes
Finally a short comment on the use of references and footnotes. Anything that is
directly referenced can be found in parenthesis in the main text. Footnotes are re-
served for notes of the ‘further reading’-kind and enhancements that are not di-
rectly related to the main text but which still may be of interest to the reader. It is
my aim to make the main text readable and understandable without looking at
single footnote. The reader may return to the footnotes after reading the main text.
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The Relationship between Acts and Dis-
tributions
The amoral versus the moral state
The objective for this section is to demonstrate that acts, or rather that social acts
have distributive consequences. I intend to present a general theory about acts and
their distributive consequences rather than to discuss how specific acts might re-
sult in specific distributions.
This far we don’t want anything to do with ethics—it would cloud the preci-
sion of the analysis unnecessarily at this point. The idea for this essay is to isolate
the effects of ethical considerations on the distributive outcomes of acts. So first
we analyze the distributive outcomes of acts without ethical constraints on indi-
vidual choice, then we add the component of ethics, which we’ll do in the next
chapter.
A fruitful way of accomplishing a discussion of the distributive outcomes of
acts without involving ethics, believe, is to utilize the theoretical complex of the
state-of-nature, although cast in a slightly different form. The state-of-nature in
political theory is appropriately described as an imag inary reconstruction of how
human life and interpersonal relations of different kinds might have been before
the creation of political institutions. This image is most often used to shed light on
the disadvantages of such pre-political life in order to justify some organized po-
litical existence (cf. Robertson, 1993 for a lexical definition). The state-of-nature
theory was most famously used by Hobbes in Leviathan and Locke in Two Trea-
ties of Government, for justifying their disparate ideas on the ideal state (Hobbes,
1968; Locke, 1960).4
Here, we are interested in the single act a human being might undertake in rela-
tions with others, and his ethical reflections when choosing his acts, rather than
sweeping arrangements of social institutions. We are interested in the individual’s
sense of right and wrong, his sense of good and evil, if you like, when choosing to
act. So, the state-of-nature might in this case need a little refinement to fit the oc-
casion. As Nozick notes in Anarchy, State and Utopia, the state-of-nature “begins
with fundamental general descriptions of morally permissible and impermissible
actions[.]” (Nozick, 1974:7). Morals, but no social institutions. The idea here is
consequently to take another (hypothetical) step back and remove even the com-
ponent of morals. I will hence construe the moralistic restatement of the state-of-
4 State-of-Nature theory has been used in more recent times, perhaps most famously by Rawls and
Nozick in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Anarchy, State and Utopia respectively (1974). Rawls’
argument about the ‘veil of ignorance’ is, although he seems reluctant to actually labal it a ‘state-
of-nature’, precisely an application of the theory. Nozick used it more explicitly to aruge the rise
of a state via an invisible-hand process. Schotter (1981) argued the rise of economic and social in-
stitutions via a similar invisible-hand process.
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nature as a place where morals do not exist, an amoral place where no concept of
right and wrong exists in the minds of its occupying individuals.
In this place any act is morally permissible and so is any distributive conse-
quence that might result. In contrast, I will designate another place, the moral
place, where every aspect of the amoral place is held constant except for the intro-
duction of ethics. Individuals in this place make moral considerations before act-
ing, they have a sense of right and wrong. I shall attempt to demonstrate how eth-
ics here function as constraints on actions, making certain acts morally impermis-
sible. I ought then be clear that if certain acts are not allowed according to some
schema for right and wrong, the distributive consequences of such disallowed acts
will not factor in. The imposition of an ethic over an amoral situation, this ought
to demonstrate, has consequences for the distributive outcomes of interactions.
This might seem a strange way to go about it. No such place has ever existed,
primitive morals have arguably been with humanity since the dawn of our spe-
cies—morals don’t just pop out of nowhere from an amoral to a moral place. It’s
important to remember that I’m not making any statement as to the real origin or
function of morals in human affairs. This is just a piece of methodological trickery
for the purpose of isolating the effects of moral constraints on the distributive
consequences of acts, which is the only task at hand here. Nozick notes, “state-of-
nature explanations […] pack explanatory punch and illumination, even of incor-
rect. We learn much by seeing how [things] could have arisen, even if it didn’t
arise that way” (Nozick, 1974:8-9). My ambition with this explanation is that
when seeing how ethics act as a constraint on individuals’ choice of actions from
imposing an ethic over an amoral place we can then extrapolate and see how dif-
ferent ethics will shape individual choice as to produce different distributive con-
sequences. For instance, we might be able to draw conclusions such as ‘Ethic ‘E’
restrain choice of action in manner such and such and produces distributive con-
sequence ‘D’. One might then make comparisons and see that ‘another ethic ‘E1’
restrains choice of actions in another manner such and such which produces dis-
tributive consequence ‘D1’. That is, to extrapolate and to find that there is some
predictive relation between a specific ethic and a certain distribution.
The astute reader will note that the amoral place might arguably be perceived
as nothing but the standard rational choice framework. This is arguably correct
and in that case, this set up of comparing the choice of actions under amoral con-
ditions versus moral conditions can be seen as a methodological attempt to intro-
duce a component of ethics into the rational choice model for the purpose of iso-
lating the effects on choice by moral restraints.5 Possibly, one could phrase it as
5 A few words should be said about the often confusing relationship between egoism and the as-
sumption of utility maximization in rational-actor perspectives. Rationality does not require self-
interest, although it is often assumed. It only requires that individuals are able to rank alternatives
and choose between them in a way that satisfies the individual’s preferences. Rationality does not
make any moral claim as to what those preferences ought to be. An individual may very well have
a set of preferences that are altruistic. In this sense the rational actor perspective is amoral (Haus-
man, et al., 1996).
But it is important to note that rationality does have a moral dimension. The very definition of
rationality as choosing those acts which have as their outcome the satisfaction of a preference
ranking is arguably the same as saying that people ought to choose rationally. Rationality is itself a
normative term (cf. Hausman et al., 1996)
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such: the preferences that make up the foundation for individual choice (described
in the utility function in economic theory) originate partially from ethics, our
sense of right and wrong partially shape our utility functions. Another analogy is
perhaps that ethics filter preferences according to a schema of right and wrong,
and hence change the character of the utility function, and hence of the choices
individuals make and then also the distributive consequences.
In the amoral state then, people choose according to the assumptions of the ra-
tional choice perspective. They seek to maximize their lifetime expected utility
from a set preferences that are described in a utility function and they choose ac-
tions which fulfil these preferences. They are constrained only by the relative
prices of goods, transaction costs (such as the cost of contracting exchanges or
cooperation) and technology (for instance, information technology). However to
keep it simple, and for the purpose of isolating the constraints of morals, which
we’ll add later, we’ll assume zero transaction costs and perfect information (cf.
Ward, 2002; Nicholson, 2002 for more on these axioms common to rational
choice applications) How do individuals choose to act in such a state?
Acts and Social Acts in the Amoral State
The first thing that ought to be done is to delimit the array of acts that are subject
to analysis. Acts are many a kind and we are only interested in certain types of
acts, namely those with some distributive consequence, and those that, even
though we are yet to include it in the analysis, pertain to ethics in some manner.
We are hence interested in acts in which there is some interconnectedness be-
tween individuals. My actions are connected to yours when the outcome of some
action of yours depends upon what I do. Conversely, my actions can affect the
outcome of one of your actions. The outcomes of our actions can be mutually af-
fected by our actions or the outcome of our actions etc. Frequently, the actions of
different individuals are interconnected and the outcomes are affected in some
nontrivial fashion. Human beings know their actions are tied to the actions and
outcomes of others and this is the reason people coordinate their actions with oth-
ers. This is also the background that gives rise to ethics (cf. Nozick, 2001: 240 et
seq. on the interconnectedness of human actions). Sociologist Herbert Mead
(1934) designated acts with some degree of interconnectedness social acts, as op-
posed to just acts, which are things individuals do that do not have any affect on
the actions or outcomes of others (if there is any such act in any kind of social
situation). We are interested in these social acts, or more precisely we are inter-
ested in acts where units of benefits (or utility, the terms are used interchangeably)
are distributed in some fashion over the interacting parties.
Do all acts have distributive consequences? On a metaphysical level I would
suggest that one may attach distributive consequences to any kind of act. If bene-
fits, or utility if you prefer that term, can be anything to which an individual at-
In this essay I’ll treat the assumptions of rationality as amoral—people are rational, they cannot be
anything but rational, hence the moral implications of rationality can be set aside. But now the
reader has at least been warned.
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taches some positive value (which I would suggest is the standard definition of
utility) then acts will possibly always generate benefits that are distributed over
actors between which there is some connection. For instance, if I read a book (and
enjoy it) it will be beneficial to me. The writer derives some satisfaction perhaps
knowing that there are readers enjoying his book. Perhaps I’ve bought the book
from someone and that is beneficial for him. The ideas of the writer are prolifer-
ated through me which is beneficial for the writer. I might spread the ideas to oth-
ers which might have beneficial consequences for them and so on. All these acts
distribute benefits over many people, but they would likely be very hard to ob-
serve or even make educated guesses about. The relationship between these acts
seems fragile and hard to grasp.
Another example where the distributive consequences would be hard to grasp
would be that of the hermit. The hermit living in a cabin deep in the woods far
from any civilized society also acts every day. But his actions might not affect the
actions or outcomes of other people. He has no counterpart to worry about that is
a person. However, he might chop down trees for firewood to heat his cabin and
the like, which may somewhere down the line be construed as an externality for
others. He can possibly be said to act with nature as a direct counterpart. Societies
have had ethical concerns about human beings acting with ‘nature’ or ‘the envi-
ronment’ as a counterpart, but we’ll leave these concerns aside here. They may
very well result in benefits for the acting individual but can nature enjoy benefits?
I shall assume it can’t and hence the issue of distributions is a moot question be-
cause the acts of individuals in such cases are not in any way related to those of
another individual and is hence not to be construed as a social act.
It is of course entirely possible that interacting with nature as a counterpart af-
fects other individuals as third parties, that is, interacting with nature cause the
emergence of externalities which affects others.6 The example of a paper mill pol-
luting a steam that is also used by a village with fishing as its main industry is
well known in economic theory (cf. Rosen, 2001; Perman et al., 2003). For the
sake of brevity, however, I shall ignore the problem of externalities here.
But acts may have much clearer distributive consequences. Take for instance a
trade situation were I exchange my X for your Y. I need X and you need Y so the
trade is mutually beneficial. Our actions have resulted in a net positive allocation
of benefits for both of us. The acts, the exchange, have redistributed the alloca-
tions of benefits that we are both endowed with. We started out with endowments
A and B and then we traded X and Y which resulted in positive benefits for both of
us and as such also resulted in a change of endowments for A and B to A’ and B’.
In terms of end-state distributions, benefits were allocated in distribution X before
the trade. The trade rearranged both our endowments and are now allocated ac-
cording to new distribution X’. Interactions such as these quite clearly
(re)distribute benefits over the acting parties in different fashions. (cf. the eco-
nomic theory of the exchange in Rosen, 2002:31 et seq.; Schotter, 2001:127 et
seq.). It’s important to note that we cannot know the actual distributions without
knowing what is traded and what each individual values about the trade, however,
6 For more on the problems of externalities see (Rosen, 2002; Schotter, 2001; Levy, 1995; Perman
et al., 2003).
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we do not need know that in order to see that interactions create and alter distribu-
tions of benefits.
The exchange situation may not only have the character of a trade, it can be
some coordination of actions towards some mutually beneficial goal such as pro-
curing the provision of some public good (like protection or the installation of a
sewage for the town or something else).7 Distributions of benefits from coopera-
tion of this kind may have a wide range of end-states, depending on the shape of
the demand-curves for the cooperating individuals (cf. Rosen, 2001: 58 et seq.). It
is reasonable to assume that at least sometimes some individuals want the public
good more than others and will hence value it higher. This will give rise to dis-
tributive concerns at least if there exist no payment technology which allows indi-
viduals to pay relative to their demand for the good, that is, if everyone pays the
same price but benefits are unequally distributed (Rosen, 2002:58; Schotter,
2001:653 et seq.).
This is also where the well-known theories of market failures enter the picture.
Rational utility-maximizers will, according to the theory, forgo contributing to the
production of the public good, thinking that everyone else will (e.g. they will free-
ride of the efforts of others) and as a result the provision of the public good fails
(Munday, 2000; Rosen, 2001; Schotter, 2001; Samuelson, 1954; Bator, 1958). But
assuming that we can get past the problem of market failure, for instance, as has
been suggested by Schotter (1981), Ostrom (1990; 1997), if a group develops
norms that further cooperative ends, there is still the issue of how benefits ought
to be distributed.8 What these distributions ought to be is likely to differ with dif-
ferent ethical foundations, say between an ethic that prescribes non-interference
(such as a libertarian ethic), from one that prescribes (distributive) equality (such
as a socialist ethic certain versions of utilitarianism).
Nozick (2001) points out that all coordinated actions may not have a distinctly
ethical dimension. For instance if I follow you in order to get to the bus station
where I want to go but do not know the way. It is your destination as well and I
know because I overheard you in a conversation you had with someone else, but
you do not know that I follow you. The exchange is not willfully enacted by one
of the parties. Nozick seems to prefer to call this strategic coordination and save
the dimension of ethics for mutual exchanges (Nozick, 2001:244). We have simi-
lar situations in prisoner’s dilemma type games where there exist uncertainty
about the counterpart’s intentions and moves. However, are situations like these
completely devoid of ethics? Might there exist values concerning taking advan-
tage of people in the way that I did when I followed you to bus station (even
though most, I think, would consider such a coordination of actions rather harm-
less). Perhaps some ethic mandating ‘credit where credit is due’. If you help me,
whether you know it or not, should I not thank you, or repay you somehow?
Acts are not always voluntary, but none the less they have distributive conse-
quences. Coercion is a nontrivial part of any society I can think of, even in fic-
7 The problem of public goods provision (and the related topic of market failure is exposed in
(Schotter, 2001, Rosen, 2002, Levy, 1995). A critical examination of standard public goods theory
is Cowen (1988).
8 The emergence of norms that further cooperation between individuals has also been dealt exten-
sively by Axelrod (1984), Taylor (1976, 1987), Knight (1992) and North, 1990).
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tional-philosophical libertarian utopias like Ayn Rand’s Atlantis or Nozick’s
framework for utopia (Rand, 1956; Nozick, 1974). I should like to distinguish be-
tween two major coercive categories of acts. First there is coercion enforced by a
central authority, such as a state levying taxes, where everyone in society is co-
erced to act in a certain way. Reasonably one may assume that, in the case of pay-
ing taxes, nobody (really) likes it, which would mean that individuals paying tax
would be moved to a lower indifference curve. Hence the act of coercing people
to pay taxes has a distributive dimension. (Taxation is a public bad in the sense
that it creates net negative allocations of benefits spread across everyone subjected
to it, but it too, as with the public good, may be disliked to a different degree giv-
ing rise to inequality in distributions.)
Second, there is the case when individuals perform coercive acts against others,
for instance when A coerces B into doing something that B would not otherwise
like to do, which would hence moves him to a lower indifference curve.9 The act
benefits A but not B and as such there are distributive consequences that may be
subject to variance with different ethical foundations.
There might for instance exist values that disallow moving someone else to a
lower indifference curve, no matter what the circumstance. There might be values
disallowing such moves under only certain circumstances, say, when exercising
some moral right, such as a property right. Asserting ones right over a piece of
property may be detrimental to the endowment of benefits for another, but still not
be considered morally wrong in some ethical positions. No ethical foundation for
disallowing (at least all) acts of this kind seem to be supported by, for instance the
libertarian position, however there do exist an ethical foundation disallowing co-
ercive acts of the first kind discussed above, that is, coercion by a central author-
ity.10 There might be ethics disallowing all coercive acts, there might ethics disal-
lowing only some coercive acts. I’m not sure what ethical foundation would be of
the first kind, not even anarchic systems say ‘anything goes under any circum-
stance’. No matter what, there will be distributive consequences and they might be
variant under different ethical foundations.
A Theoretical Framework for Measuring the
Distributive Consequences of Acts
How do we structure knowledge about what distributive consequences acts have?
We need some general frame of analysis from which we may then continue to
analyze how these distributions relate to different ethics. The economic theory of
the exchange economy as presented in the economist diagram of an Edgeworth
Box will adequately provide what we need (Rosen, 2002:31 et seq.; Schotter,
2001:127 et seq.) This diagram (figure 1 below) consists of two facing indiffer-
ence curve diagrams for individuals A and B, where on the X and Y axis of each
diagram we have some social good (denoted SG) which would be beneficial to
9 Dahl produced an exeptional systemitization of different concepts of power and coercion in
Modern Political Analysis (1990).
10 See for instance Narveson (2001) for some concepts about the libertarian theory of rights.
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both individuals. Points on the two indifference curves, measured on the X and Y
axis, denote the individuals’ initial endowments of social benefits (procured from
previous interaction). The two facing indifference curves (IA and IB) form a foot-
ball-like (American football, that is) figure which is the area between IA and IB.
This area denotes benefits that are up for grabs by both of them if they coordinate
their actions in some way. Interaction moves these curves in different fashions
and when the curves are moved the distributions of benefits change accordingly.
The outcomes of acts displayable in this diagram may be to mutual benefit and
they may detrimental to one individual’s endowments. End-state distributions may
or may not be efficient and if efficient and if efficient the distributive point may
end up anywhere on the contract curve (the contract curve is displayed in figure 2
below), leaving individuals with endowments that are however unequal. In the
amoral state any act is permissible and as such any distributive point in the Edge-
worth Box may be the consequence. The only constraints upon action are those of
the individual utility functions which determine the preferences of the interacting
individuals, the availability of information (i.e., technology), and the transaction
costs for interacting.
When we impose an ethic over the amoral situation the ethic will act as a re-
straint on action according to some schema for good and bad. Some actions will
be disallowed and the possible moves of the indifference curves may take will be
delimited. However, I shall first provide some more detail of the different moves
the indifference curves may take.
There are four types of norms that can be described in the Edgeworth box (fig-
ure 1 and 2) with the two facing indifference curves and the (football-shaped) lace
astride in the middle containing possible Pareto-improving distributive points (cf.
Nozick, 2001). The first kind of norm is one that is mutually beneficial. These
norms correspond to the criteria of Pareto-improvement, that is, a move that either
IA
SGA1
SGA2
SGB1
SGB2 B
A
The diagram shows the utility position of A shift, either to lower or a higher allocation, as a
result of some interaction between A and B.
IB Figure 1: Outcomes of acts in an Edge-
worth Box
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brings both individuals to a higher indifference curve (the case of strong Pareto-
improvement), or one that moves one individual to a higher indifference curve
while the other at least remains on his original endowment (the case of weak Pa-
reto-improvement). This could be a trade of some kind (I’ll trade my X for your
Y) or a coordination of actions towards some commonly beneficial goal such as
procuring the production of some public good (like social order, peace, protection
etc).
The second type of norm has the character of a zero sum game, that is, indi-
viduals act in ways that move one of them to a higher indifference curve at the
other’s expense, that is, the other individual is moved to a lower indifference
curve. Such cases might involve one individual coercing the other into doing
something he does not want to do but one might certainly question if all moves to
a lower indifference curve originate with coercion. Nozick (2001:264) notes that
some moves of that kind may be self-contracted, that is, an individual voluntarily
agrees to acts that are detrimental to his own utility position (for instance trading
to his own detriment for one reason or other). However, one must seriously ques-
tion if such voluntary detrimental moves are possibly under an assumption of ra-
tional utility maximizing individuals. Any move under such assumptions would,
I’d argue, be beneficial in one way or another, else the individual would not agree
to such a move in the first place. Any voluntary move to a different distributive
position would entail some benefits or else it would have to be considered an irra-
tional act. Hence voluntary moves to a lower indifference curve might be impos-
sible under an assumption of rational individuals.11
The third type of norm is the efficient move where both individuals move into
the lace of Pareto-improving allocations in such a manner that benefits are maxi-
mized, that is moving to a point on the contract curve (the shoe lace curve cutting
across the entire diagram in figure 2 below) which represents possible efficient
distributions given the restriction set by both individual’s utility functions. This is
a point where one individual cannot act so that he will be better off without mak-
ing the other less well off (cf. Schotter 2001:127 et seq.; Rosen, 2002:31 et seq.
for more on efficient distributions).
The fourth type of move mandates a specific point on the contract curve ac-
cording to some notion of how efficient allocations of benefits ought to be distrib-
uted. This forth type is what economists and political scientists discuss within the
field of distributive justice and is perhaps what first comes to mind when speaking
of distributions.12 There are of course ethical considerations that deal directly with
distributions of efficient points (such as the ethics of socialism which mandates
equal distributions of income), but it ought to be quite clear that any of the four
norms alter distributions in ways that might backtrack to some ethical foundation.
11 Some have distringuished between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ rationality models, the first being the stan-
dard model used in simple economic models. Thick rationality models are typically augmented
with the addition of various norms that alleivate the problem of cooperation and market failure
(which is often considered a logical consequence of the standard model) See North (1990), Ostrom
(1990, 1997), Knight (1991).
12 The literatute within the field of distributive justice is ample. Some works displaying different
normative positions include Rawls (1971), Nozick (1974), Cohen (1995). See also the modern
economic variant of utilitariansism and its rationale for income redistribution in Rosen (2002),
Berg (forthcoming) and Barr (1998) for other perspectives.
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Actions of any kind, where two (or more) individuals are involved may have dis-
tributive consequences and hence ethics dealing with the rightness of any action
that results in any of the norms will affect distributions.
These norms can arguably be said to have a meta-character. For instance, some
ethical foundation E might produce norms permitting acts that move some indi-
vidual to a lower utility position, as will some other ethical foundation E’. How-
ever, the particular acts that produce the norm might be very different under the
two ethics. For instance, one ethic might mandating that some acts which move an
individual to a lower indifference curve might be morally permissible while other
would not. An ethic might prohibit me plunging a knife into your thigh and hence
significantly reduce your endowment of benefits, but the same ethic might allow
me to exercise my rights over some property of mine. Both acts would be detri-
mental to your utility position. Another ethic might have a completely different
set of permissible acts that all fall under the meta-norm of moving an individual to
a lower indifference curve.
Is it then possible to deconstruct different ethics in such a way that one may
clearly see how these four norms emerge in different constellations from a par-
ticular foundation of values? The question of defining a society’s ethical founda-
tion in order to procure distributive shares hinges on the strength of this relation.
If it is weak the struggle for moral authority would have to be explained by some
other means, but if strong, struggles for distributive shares might be valuable
component in explaining political struggle.
It would be interesting to see how much of normative ethics, for instance
Kant’s imperatives of duty (i.e., those that siphon down into the Categorical Im-
perative etc.) (cf. Kant, 1994) or ethical egoism (Rand, 1961; Rachels, 1999), or
W.D Ross’s prima facie duties13 (Ross, 1930) or virtue ethics (cf. Statman, 1997),
13 Ross’s prima facie duties are: Gratitude, justice, of beneficience, of self-improvement, of non-
malificence, duty to keep promises (Ross, 1930).
IA
IB
SGA1
SGA2
SGB1
SGB2 B
A
This figure displays several moves that are mutually beneficial (moves into the shaded
area). It also displays an efficient allocation on the contract curve.
Figure 2: Allocations of benefits with
a contract curve
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that may encompassed by these four norms. That is if human interactions are con-
ducted after the schemas for right and wrong that these normative ethics provide,
what constellation of these four norms would emerge? It is quite possible that eth-
ics is something that go beyond a reduction towards distributive outcomes and sat-
isfaction of preferences. For instance, what distributive outcomes will an adher-
ence to the cardinal virtues14 produce? It would possibly depend on defining very
clearly what such virtues are and what it means to act in accordance with them,
which would certainly not be an easy task. However interesting, it is beyond the
scope of the essay to engage in an analysis that covers so many fronts.
14 The Cardinal virtues in Catholism are justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude (cf. Catholic
Encyclopidia (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03343a.htm : 2005-01-08). All other virtues fall
back on these four principle virtues.
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The Relationship Between Ethics and
Distributions
The Moral Place: Ethics as constraints on Action
What if we then impose some notion of right and wrong to the actions of individ-
ual? In the amoral state individuals chose their actions from a set of preferences
without any concern for right and wrong in relation with others. This we con-
cluded could have any distributive consequence, i.e., the distributive point could
land anywhere in the Edgeworth Box (given the restraints of technology, relative
prices and transaction costs which we have ignored). We will now have them act
morally and see how this might affect distributions.
The question of right and wrong acts is dealt with within the field of Normative
Ethics.15 Moral philosophers concerned with this field ideally try to provide some
general formula(s) for deciding what actions are right (cf. Snare, 1992). It is, with
a minimal definition, an effort to guide conduct by reason, rather than by emotion
or intuition (cf. Rachels, 1999: 17 et seq.) A possible schema, as Snare suggests,
would be something like ‘All acts with the property ‘P’ are right’ (Snare, 1992:5
et seq.). Different moral philosophers would then substitute ‘P’ with things like
‘adherence to set of rights’, or ‘maximizing social utility’, or ‘being commanded
by God’. Different ethical theories disagree quite fundamentally, but they are all
trying to accomplish the same thing, namely to provide a general principle from
which actions can be classified into right or wrong.
Further, any theory of normative ethics tries to determine, not only what prop-
erties P1…Pn make a certain act right, but also why property Pi makes an act right,
i.e., a normative theory does not analyze what properties P1…Pn an act that is right
happens to have, but what qualities intrinsic to that particular property that de
facto makes the act right. The latter is a most complex issue. For instance, in the
case of a rights-based ethic, the former criterion would suggest that any action that
conforms to the set of rights is right, while the latter would concern itself with the
rights themselves. Why are the rights right-making properties?
We do not yet need to concern ourselves with what property is right-making
and we will not concern ourselves at all with the why a particular property is
right-making. The former will be partially answered with examples of how certain
ethics may generate certain distributive norms and will be dealt with in the next
section. The latter question would force us to engage in a normative argument,
pinning ethic against ethic trying to answer which is right and which wrong. That
is of course not the purpose here.
15 As opposed to meta-ethics, which seek to determine, not what is right, but what it means to be
right (or wrong), i.e., what is the very nature of rightness? Meta-ethics can be described as the phi-
losophy of science for Ethics (Snare, 1992: 4 et seq.)
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In the amoral state any action was permissible. Individuals chose action after
some utility function subject only to the restraints of relative prices (and transac-
tion costs which assume to be zero and technology which we assume function as
such that there is perfect information). An economist might express it so that util-
ity function U(i) = (SG1, SG2…SGn) for individual i is here subject to the re-
straint of relative prices of the social goods (SG) the individual is demanding (cf
Nicholson, 2002:93 et seq.). In the moral state the general principle for good and
bad will now act as a constraint as well, making some actions morally impermis-
sible. So in addition to the restraint of prices the utility function U(i) is now also
subject to a some set of values S(v) = V1…Vn which the interacting people might
share.
A fitting analogy, as already mentioned, is possibly that the set of values func-
tions as a filter for good and bad through which the individual’s preferences are
sifted, where ‘improper’ preferences are sifted out and discarded. This filter alters
the utility function, that is, the individual’s preferences are altered to fit the social
foundation of good and bad. With a different utility function people chose differ-
ently, and hence with different actions we also have different distributive out-
comes.
The result of an imposed principle for good and bad might then affect choices
in the following manner. In the amoral state a certain act A resulted in distributive
outcome D. However with the restraint of values S(v) = V1…Vn act A is now im-
permissible and outcome D not possible. Likewise we can now extrapolate this
pattern and conclude that some other set of values S’(v) = V1…Vn might allow
act A but not act B, which would yield some different distributive outcome D1.
Hence one might say that from different ethical foundations there will emerge dif-
ferent distributive norms because depending upon what filter we run preferences
through the choices people make are different.
It is however, one thing to say that there is a relationship between an ethic and
a distributive norm and another to say exactly what that relationship is. That is,
what is the level of predictability between some ethic and a corresponding dis-
tributive norm? In order to shed some light on this one would preferably decon-
struct some ethic to see what acts under its restraints might produce in terms of
distributive norms. Below I shall attempt a rather brief deconstruction of a utilitar-
ian and a libertarian position in order to exemplify the argument put forth here.
Two Ethical Positions
There seems to be a link between distributive outcomes and ethics but as of yet
the relation to the question of struggles for moral authority is still unclear. We
now know that actions have distributive consequences and that ethics filter indi-
viduals’ choices of actions and hence alter distributions, but we still don’t know in
what way. The claim that people struggle for moral authority, we concluded,
hinges, apart from what the assumption of rational utility maximizing individuals
provide, on some level of predictability between a certain ethic and its distributive
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consequences. We’ve established that there is a connection, but we have yet to es-
tablish any level of accuracy.
An appropriate way to establish the accuracy we are looking for would be, I
think, to establish some foundation of values and see how this relates to the four
norms described above. We need to construct some schema for good or bad, again
using Snare’s terminology, and see what kind of distributive norms that would
reasonably follow in its wake from the acts of individuals. As mentioned above
accounts of normative ethics abound. The proper way in this case where we have
a limited space available, ought to be to choose two very different ethics which
clearly demonstrate a disparity in norms that follow. The ethical positions of utili-
tarianism and libertarianism, I believe, will accomplish that.
As a secondary reason, I think both these schools of thought are appropriate is
that are both fairly coherent and the different proposed ethical foundations within
the schools themselves, while exhibiting some disparity, are relatively homoge-
nous and easy to summarize into a tangible ethical position. Admittedly the choice
of these two ethics is rather favorable towards the purpose of the essay, that is to
analyze the relation between ethics and distributive norms. Both display a close
proximity to the subject of distributions. The very notion of utility in utilitarian-
ism implies by itself that good or bad is a function of distributive outcomes (cf.
Kymlicka, 1990; Rachels, 1999; Rosen, 2001). Then there is the ongoing debate
on distributive justice in the works of Rawls and Nozick which both take as their
point of origin the utilitarian notion of justice as maximization of the social good
(Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974). The framework for distributive consequences is al-
ready well mapped out with these ethical positions, although perhaps not in the
way we are trying to do here, that is, norms as consequences of acts at the indi-
vidual level. My point is that it almost certainly will be easier to flesh out dis-
tributive consequences from a utilitarian schema of good and bad, than from say
some application of virtue ethics, or Kantian imperatives of duty (however one
should absolutely not exclude ex ante the possibility they too could be encom-
passed in some way by the distributive norms discussed above).
The utilitarian position then. Concisely defined, utilitarianism is the political,
social and moral theory developed first by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, and
further developed (possibly refined) by John Stuart Mill. It holds (in its original
version) as its core an equation between the good and happiness (cf Bentham,
1994; Mill, 1987; for a lexical definition see Robertson, 1993 or Banncock et al.,
1998). It proposes that whatever action taken, whether policy, individual choice or
decision, it should result in a maximization of the positive balance of ‘good’ over
‘bad’. More precisely, utilitarianism argues the ‘principle of utility’, which re-
quires that whenever a choice between alternative actions or social policies, the
one which results in the best overall, or social, consequences, should be chosen.
There are several variants of utilitarianism. Here we’ll use the modern variant
prominent in economic theory and leave aside others like hedonistic utilitarianism
where utility is equated to happiness, we’ll ignore the distinction between prefer-
ence satisfaction and satisfaction of only enlightened preferences (that is prefer-
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ences based on perfect information and valid judgements) and so fort.16 The mod-
ern economic variant simply assumes preference satisfaction and that acts ought
to maximize social utility (Kymlicka, 1990).
In economic theory the social good is often represented by the social welfare
function. Algebraically, if there are n members of a society and the ith individual’s
utility is represented by Ui, then social welfare is:
( )nUUUFW ,..., 21=
It is assumed that an increase in any of the Uis, ceteris paribus, will increase W
(cf. Rosen, 2002:141 et. seq.). The strictly utilitarian position then advocates that
any act which leads to a net increase of W is a justifiable act, and one that ought to
be executed. It is further assumed that interpersonal comparisons of individual
utility functions are possible. This implies that an action, A, which seems to de-
crease individual X’s utility less than it increases the utility of individual Y, yields
a net increase in W. The constraint of the utilitarian normative positions is then
that any action (taken by an individual, an institution or an organization) must
conform with the condition that it increases the overall social welfare, W. This is
the general principle of this ethical theory, or in Snare’s terminology, it is the
schema for good or bad. An act that increases social utility is a good act, one that
does not, is not.
Libertarianism then is a social and political theory that holds as its core that in-
dividuals have a certain set of inviolable rights which delimits the sphere of ac-
tions available to individuals (directed towards other individuals) and to the state.
I will here refer to the particular version of libertarianism represented by Robert
Nozick, which has its foundation in the writings of Locke (Nozick, 1974; Locke,
1960).
Libertarianism is arguably the modern heir to nineteenth century liberalism. It
grew partially from a critique of utilitarianism, one of which the most prominent
feature is that it is an aggregative theory. In utilitarianism, increases (or de-
creases) in overall utility come from adding together each individual’s separate
utility function. Utilitarians themselves point to this as one of the strongest merits
of the theory—it employs a simple model of rationality that works well at the in-
dividual level; act so that your own welfare increases. If met by two choices, one
of which yields less of an increase in utility than the other, the one which yields
the greatest increase should be chosen. Proponents of utilitarianism posit the no-
tion that this rationale can be properly transferred to the social level—act so that
social welfare increases. This entails that the interests of some individuals, yield-
ing a lower overall increase in social utility, can be forsaken for the interests of
others, which yield a higher increase. Some individuals may be sacrificed for the
greater good of society (cf. Norman, 1998).
The analogy is fallacious, claims others. As Nozick puts it “There is no social
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only
individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives”
16 The interested reader would want to see Kymlicka (1990) for the distinction between different
kinds of utilitarianism.
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(Nozick, 1974:33). A social good, according to Nozick, does not exist because a
society is only the sum of its individuals. Society is not single agent who can ex-
perience good, or make decisions, or bear blame. A person who is overridden in a
utilitarian calculus is simply sacrificed for someone else’s benefit, nothing else
(Nozick, 1974). 17
Critics of utilitarianism have therefore looked for some other theory that cap-
tures the idea that individuals cannot be sacrificed for other’s benefit. One such
theoretical idea is that there might exist moral rights—individuals have rights in
one form or another, which may not be violated. All actions, all pursuit of goals,
whatever they may be, must conform to the set of defined rights that is inherent to
each individual. The rights are the constraints of a libertarian ethical position. 18
Adherence to a specific set of rights is the general principle, or the schema for
good and bad, for a rights-based ethics.19 What then, constitutes the rights of the
libertarian normative position?
In Anarchy, State and Utopia Nozick holds basically that each person is a sepa-
rate individual with the inviolable right to live as he chooses, conditional only
upon a respect for other individuals’ rights to do the same. These rights include
the traditional liberal right to non-interference, to own one’s body and mind20 and
to own and use in any way ones legitimately acquired property, and to enjoy the
fruits of voluntarily entered contracts.21 One may enforce these rights against
others unless one has voluntarily contracted the rights out. The rights do not in-
clude any uncontracted right to assistance from others, and correspondingly ones
obligations to others are similarly limited (Lacy, 2001:20).22 The origin of these
17 To this a utilitarian economist might retort by citing the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Criteria. It
states that wealth can be redistributed between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ resulting from a given
policy. It is uncertain, however, what utility distribution might result from this and it requires a
definition of what ‘good’ is before it can be redistributed. The Kaldor-Hick Criteria is hence sub-
ject to the same problems of preference aggregation as any other derivation of social preferences.
(cf. Rosen, 2002: 290; Schotter, 2001: 81 et seq.).
18 Many libertarian thinkers, such as F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises reject rights
as the basis for justification and argue for the libertarian position on the basis of its beneficial con-
sequences, i.e., that laissez-faire market economies produces the Greatest Happiness. Though not
utilitarian in any strict sense, they are decidedly teleological, not deontological. (cf. Friedman,
1962; 1990; Hayek, 1960; Mises, 1949).
19 All rights-based ethics are not libertarian. For instance, John Rawls devised his Theory of Justice
based on a set of rights which is not strictly libertarian. Rawls’ position is a complex one, and lib-
ertarianism, is by comparison, at least in a scaled down form, not equally so (in my opinion),
which is why we’ll use the libertarian position rather than that of Rawls’ (Rawls, 1971).
20 This is generally referred to as self-ownership, which in libertarian though is the point of origin
for all other application of rights including rights to material wealth. For a critical relfection see
Kymlicka, 1990). For an exposition of a more communitarian approach to the issue of self owner-
ship see Cohen (1995) and for a comparision and critical analysis see Narveson (1998).
21 Confer Locke’s labor-mixing argument in (Locke, 1960) and Nozick’s modified version in
(Nozick, 1974:174) for an exposé of what constitutes legitimately acquired property from the
original position and Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice for just acquisition via transfers of
property (Nozick, 1974:150: passim).
22 Libertarianism, perhaps unlike utilitarianism, should not be considered a complete theory of eth-
ics, as should not any other ethic based on rights. A set of rights acts as a constraint on some ac-
tions, i.e., actions that would violate the rights. In other cases, such as situations when the rights
are not in danger of being violated, a libertarian ethic will offer no guidance, whereas utilitarian
ethics would (act so that social welfare increases). Take the example of helping a poor man on the
street. A utilitarian would likely come to the conclusion that helping him with a few coins would
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rights is uncertain in Nozick’s writings, as they are in other libertarian works, but
they are seen as preceding political life, not being a product of political process
itself.23
These rights bear implications for the actions of the state. It may not intervene
into civil society, for instance to balance the distribution of rights (which is egali-
tarian; all individuals have these rights), or designate new rights, for instance
rights to material welfare such a job, housing or welfare payments to alleviate
poverty.24
The result following the internal logic of libertarian theory is that justification
can only be made for the very minimal state, one which is dedicated to protect life
and property and to enforce contracts. No redistribution of material welfare and no
regulation of economic activities beyond enforcing voluntary contracts is morally
permissible.
The Ethical Positions and Distributive Norms
What kind of distributive norms can one expect to emerge from these ethical posi-
tions, starting with the utilitarian? The schema for good and bad suggests that
good acts are those which contribute to the net positive sum of utility in society.
The short answer is simply norms that increase W, that is, which increase social
utility. Unfortunately the short answer doesn’t tell us very much. What specific
content would say a meta-norm of the second kind discussed above, that is norms
allowing acts that move an individual to lower indifference, have? What array of
acts would bring such a norm about and how would such a norm under utilitarian
premises differ from such a norm under the premises of a different ethics, e.g., the
libertarian ethic? These are the questions I shall try to shed light on in this section.
One might say that there is a drive towards equalization of utility endowments
built into to utilitarian theory, at least in the modern forms used in economic the-
ory (Rosen, 2001; Kymlicka, 1990). The first meta-norm, acts that have mutually
increase his welfare more that yours would decrease. A libertarian ethic would in this case offer no
guidance, because it rec ommends nothing when rights are not in danger of violated. The libertar-
ian rights would prevent someone from coercing you to help the man on the street, but as to help-
ing him voluntarily you are on your own. Possibly libertarianism could benefit from other ethical
theories in such cases (Norman, 1998:185 et seq.; Lacy, 2001; Nozick, 1974).
23As to different ideas of the origin of rights, Locke claimed they originated from God, given to
each man in a state-of-nature, while Ayn Rand claimed they were somehow intrinsic to human na-
ture (hence the term natural rights). Nozick treated rights as sort of self-evident, given by the
‘separateness’ of each individual (Boaz, 1997; Nozick, 1974; Rand, 1963; Rand, 1957; Locke,
1960)
24 Rights to material welfare are generally referred to positive rights, while rights to non-
interference are referred to as negative rights. Positive rights, it is often argued, would violate the
rights non-interference by breaching the property rights of others. Related to the issue of positive
versus negative rights is the issue of positive versus negative liberty. In short, negative liberty re-
fers non-interference, while positive liberty refers to those specific conditions which make a thing
possible to do. For instance creating a good life for one self requires specific conditions such as
material welfare. The material welfare is then positive liberty and positive rights are positive lib-
erty given the status of rights, say a right to a job or a house. Rights to negative liberty are the lib-
ertarian position (which is then the right to non-interference) and there are often substantial clashes
between the two concepts. Confer Narveson (2001) and Berlin (1958).
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beneficial outcomes, I believe would not offend any utilitarian. In the two-good-
two-person case interaction from a position that is pareto-inferior in such a way
that both individuals land on higher indifference curves (that is they move inwards
into the football-like shape in the Edgeworth Box – see figure 1 and 2). It is ar-
guably rather uncontroversial for any utilitarian to morally allow such acts be-
cause it will undoubtedly increase social utility when both individuals increase
their endowments. If we allow for the assumptions of the First Welfare Theorem
to play out such interaction will eventually land on an efficient distributive point.
In terms of the fourth norm above this will be on a point on the contract curve, al-
though not necessarily a point with an equal distribution. Given the initial posi-
tions of the two individuals, relative prices of socially desirable goods, technology
and transaction costs this point could potentially be anywhere on the contract
curve (Schotter, 2001:127 et seq.; Nicholson, 2002:686). The first-meta norm
alone will not explain this drive towards equality.
There are additional assumptions baked into the utilitarian theory. One of the
more prominent is the assumption of diminishing marginal utility, that is that ad-
ditional allocation is beneficial to us but decreasingly so as endowments increase
(Rosen, 2002:141 et seq; Schotter, 2001). This creates a rationale for acts moving
some people to a lower indifference curve. Individuals who have large allocations
of social benefits, and are exhibiting diminishing marginal returns, will be hurt
less, the theory says, than people with small allocations will gain and hence acts
with such outcomes will generate an increase in social utility. This makes the sec-
ond meta-norm, acts that move some individuals to a lower indifference curve,
very much a part of this ethical position.
This zero-sum-game-type of meta-norm has some degree of controversy to it,
under both utilitarian and libertarian ethics. Worsening someone’s situation must
surely be considered much more controversial than the opposite, i.e., acts that are
mutually beneficial? Utilitarianism frequently madates that some individuals en-
dowments of utility may be decreased under certain circumstances if social utility
increases. Consider the following fictitious example by H.J McClosky from the
academic journal Inquiry in 1965 (reprinted in Rachels, 1999:110): A utilitarian
visits a community in which there is a racial strife. A black man rapes a white
woman and as a result the white community goes berserk and starts beating up
every black man in sight. Suppose that it is certain that the capturing of the man
who did the crime would ease the emotions of the mob and end the violence. Our
utilitarian sees the event but not who actually did it. As a utilitarian, he would
then be advised to lie and bear false witness and bring about punishment against
an innocent man (assuming that the mob believes the innocent man is the actual
perpetrator). Presumably, the decrease in utility for the one man who is innocently
punished is much less than the sum of the many blacks who would undergo a se-
vere beating by the mob if nothing was done. Framing an innocent man would, in
this case, represent a net increase in social utility. This type of norm mandates that
it is permissible to sacrifice the utility positions of some for the sake of others,
something that has inarguably undercut much of the punch in utilitarian theory
(Kymlicka, 1990).
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This is of course an extreme example and possibly the drive towards equal dis-
tribution is not very clear with single acts like these. A much more common ex-
ample that illustrates the point better is the utilitarian rationale for government re-
distribution of income. With the assumptions of identical utility functions added
together (a so-called additive utility function), depending only on income, dimin-
ishing marginal utility and fixed total amounts of income in society the total sum
of utility can be increased by redistributing from individuals with large allocations
to those with small. The reasoning suggests that as long as incomes are unequal
social utility can be increased until an exactly equal distribution is reached (i.e, UA
= UB) (Rosen, 2002: 143).
We are now talking about redistributive acts taken at the level of state rather
than individual acts which is our focus here. One might reasonably question if it is
possible for individuals to keep track of the consequences for social utility with
every single act they undertake. Presumably it is easier for the state to make these
kind of considerations which likely is why utilitarianism seems to fit better with
aggregate level applications rather than as a guide for individual acts.
The second meta-norm has implications for the third, namely that of acting so
that distributive points in the Edgeworth Box are efficient. There can only be one
efficient point that satisfies the criteria of efficiency with the assumptions we are
working with and that is the completely equal distribution. However, unless the
outcome of voluntary acts (that is the ‘market’ outcome) with mutually beneficial
outcomes (the second meta-norm) happens to generate a completely equal distri-
bution we’re in trouble with the third meta-norm. As soon as exchanges reaches
an efficient point that is not equal the assumption of diminishing marginal utility
compels individuals to act in ways that redistribute endowments towards an equal
distribution because that will increase social utility. In other words, anyone above
the mean would be compelled, either by engaging in acts at the individual level
(say, by donating money) or by forced government redistribution, to transfer util-
ity units to those under the mean until an equal distribution occurs. Such acts can-
not be efficient since it entails outcomes that move some individuals (those with
generous endowments) to lower indifference curves (cf. Rosen, 2001:146). This
would violate the Pareto-criteria and hence produce inefficiency. Hence, if the
‘market’ outcome, i.e., the outcome of voluntary interaction, is unequal the crite-
ria of Pareto-efficiency must be broken under a schema for good and bad provided
by a utilitarian ethic—the third meta-norm is necessarily in conflict with the sec-
ond.
The distributive norms following in the wake of a libertarian ethic will differ to
a substantial degree from those of the utilitarian. The first three meta-norms will
emerge but with different specific content and circumstance. Norms to mutual
benefit are possibly the bread and butter norm of the capitalist economy which of
course is a large part libertarian political thought.25 The second norm, moving
people to lower indifference curves must necessarily have a different content—it
is related to the exercise of rights, or more precisely, of property rights. Efficient
25 Cf. (Nozick, 1974; Narvesson, 2001; Rand, 1954; Hayek, 1990; Hayek, 1948; von Mises, 1949;
Friedman, 1962, 1990) for some references about the relationship between captialism and liber-
tarianism.
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distribution may be many a kind unlike under utilitarian ethics which only al-
lowed for efficiency if the market outcome of interaction happens to generate effi-
ciency. Further, there can be no specific idea under libertarian constraints about
where a distribution ought to land on the contract curve. The major difference be-
tween the distributive norms generated under a libertarian versus that of utilitarian
ethic is that there is no specific idea on what distributions ought to be built into
the theory. The assumptions (the additive utility function) and moral imperative
(good is maximzation of social utility) of utilitarianism we saw, drove distribu-
tions towards equality which in my mind represent such a specific idea.
The idea that distributions ought to be in a particular way Nozick called an
end-state, or a patterned distribution, that is, the distributive points (prefereably
efficient points) ought land on the contract curve on point P, wherever that may
be according to some principle or other (cf. Nozick, 1974:149 et seq.). For in-
stance, ’distribute according to merit’, or ’distribute according to height’, or ’ac-
cording to need’ according to ’productive input to society’ or, as in the case of
utilitarianism according to ’what maximizes social utility’ are several such princi-
ples or patterns of distribution. The libertarian distributive norm is by comparison
non-patterned, or not an end-state principle of distribution, that is, the outcome of
individual acts can be anything, there is no particular distribution that is good, or
just or whatever word one whishes to use (Nozick, 1974:153). The libertarian
norm is by contrast a procedural or historical norm where the legitimacy of the
outcome depends solely upon the legitimacy of the transactions leading up the
outcome. If all acts leading up to a certain distribution D correspond to the con-
straints of the ethic’s schema for right and wrong, in this case the (negative) right
to non-interference, then the outcome is to be considered good no matter where it
lands on the contract curve. The distribution can be however unequal, it has no
bearing on its legitimacy.26
A fourth norm, a norm of specific ideas on where distributive points ought to
land on the contract curve, is irrelevant under a libertarian ethic. This poses a dis-
tinct contrast to the drive towards the equal distribution under the utilitarian ethic.
The libertarian ethic instead has a high focus on voluntary acts, a non-coercive
process, which presumably leads to efficiency, but not necessarily so. Should this
process not lead to efficiency the libertarian ethic would be unlikely to allow for
any state redistribution, even if only for the purpose of reaching efficiency. Ar-
guably this makes it unlikely that the third norm has any particular bearing under
libertarian constraints. Only if the market process itself produces efficiency would
the libertarian pay any attention to this norm.
So voluntary acts that are mutually beneficial is arguably the most important
norm under a libertarian ethic. However, the second norm, that is acts that move
individuals to a lower indifference curve, might just make a run for the prize. The
right to non-interference must override any other consideration in the libertarian
ethic and if the exercise of rights should move someone to a lower indifference
curve then so be it. I may not be allowed to force you to do anything against your
will and hence move you to a lower indifference curve (which would be entirely
26 Economists seem to prefer to say Process Justice when referring to Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
of Justice (Schotter, 2001:588 et seq.)
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possible under utilitarian constraints given that it increases social utility) but I
may kick you off my property. Say you were using my land for something un-
knowing that it was in fact my land. I find out and kick you out which I would be
in my right to do. However you would not be able to use my land anymore which
would presumably be detrimental to you since you obviously needed (or just
wanted) to use it. You would hence be forced to a lower indifference curve.
In summation, utilitarian ethics tend to drive distributive norms towards equal
distributions while libertarian ethics drive distributive norms towards non-
patterned distributions. It might further be interesting to apply Rawls’ difference
principle (cf. Rawls, 1971). How do the four norms relate to the arrangement of
distributive institutions in society in such a way that they are advantageous to-
wards those with the lowest endowments? An even greater challenge, perhaps,
would be Varian’s envy-free utility allocation, that is where no one envies the al-
location of another as a result of starting out from an equal position, then choosing
the allocation they want according to their preferences (Varian, 1971). It would
provide yet other schemas for good and bad to further enhance the argument of
the essay. We are however, quickly running out of space and Varian and Rawls
will have to be left out for now.
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Conclusion
The argument reviewed
The argument in this essay can be summarized with following set of premises and
conclusion:
• People are rational utility-maximizers and seek to procure benefits (or utility
units) for the purpose of reaching their life goals
• Interaction with other people is beneficial to this cause
• Interactions have distributive consequences
• Ethical concerns affect the utility functions of individuals—they choose dif-
ferently under different ethical foundations which in turn alters the distributive
outcome
• Ethical foundations can be defined by human beings
• Hence, a rationale for imposing moral beliefs on others exists in order to de-
fine the social distribution of utility to one’s own advantage. This might repre-
sent a partial answer to the question of why there is political struggle.
The following is a recount of some of the concerns I might have about this argu-
ment, and some weaknesses, if you will. It could also be viewed as a suggestion
for further research on this under-researched junction between the study of ethics
and rational choice.
It should be noted that I do not propose this as a universal and definitive an-
swer to the very big question of why there is political struggle. I do not whish to
minimize other concerns, such as belief in ideology or spiritual convictions of
good and bad which might shape our choices and actions. The procurement of dis-
tributive shares ought to be seen as a possible piece in a much larger puzzle.
It should also briefly be discussed what ‘function’ I ascribe to ethics in this ar-
gument. This essay is arguably about preferences more than ethics so what’s the
relation? A question one might legitimately ask is if ethics are a constituent of the
individual utility function or if it is just instrumental in some way. My argument is
similar, I would say, to that of Jack Knight, i.e., ethics are instrumental in justify-
ing some distributive outcome (cf. Knight, 1991). We may define ethics to justify
a particular distribution. It does not, in this model, constitute an integral part of
the individual utility function, it should rather be seen as some instrument for al-
tering it.
It should be noted that there are others who have ascribed ethics a different
function. For instance North (1990) would likely see ethics as some coordination
tool in the process of human interaction that reduces the transaction costs of inter-
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acting. While arguably still instrumental it is not an instrument of justification, but
rather one of coordination.
However, I do propose here that ethical concerns may be construed as altering
the individual utility function and might one not then also conclude that ethics are
a constituent rather than an instrument? This is perhaps a small kink in the armor
of this argument, but not one that undoes the point which is that ethical concerns
alter choices and hence the distributive outcomes they might have which in turn
creates the rationale for political struggle.
A related issue that of result of the argument, namely that under given condi-
tions (rationality etc) it is possible to show that different ethics might result in dif-
ferent distributive consequences. But one must seriously consider if the outcome
of the analysis is not limited in scope. It’s very possible that a similar analysis per-
formed on the briefly mention ethical positions of Rawls and Varian would lend
support to the argument by showing the emergence of yet other distributive
norms, but Nozickian Libertarianism, Utilitarianism, the Rawlsian position etc.
are similar types of arguments. They are based on, or at least incorporate some
element of, rational actors. As already mentioned, one might get into trouble if the
same analysis is performed on something decidedly non-rationalistic, like virtue
ethics or Kantian imperatives of duty. Ethics might not be reducible to satisfaction
of preferences as is what this argument really proposes. It should be kept in mind
that the outcome of the analysis might be limited.
Further, the world I’ve painted might look excessively like some zero-sum
game where the imposition of some ethical foundation is someone’s gain and an-
other’s loss. Is this a fair assumption to base the model on? The world is a zero-
sum game sometimes, but at other times it is not. In the real world positive-sum
games might of course exist in societies with any kind of dominant ethics, that is
to say, those who disagree might still find advantages under the imposition of
‘someone else’s’ ethical foundation. However, as a model, as a proxy for reality, I
think one might let such an assumption slide, even though it might lack a certain
nuance.
Summary
In this essay I have argued that different ethical positions produce different dis-
tributive norms. Under the assumptions of the rational actor perspective this cre-
ates a rationale for imposing ones moral beliefs on other in order to swing the so-
cial distribution of benefits to one’s own advantage. I have done so by first clari-
fying the distributive outcomes of acts at the individual level in an amoral state.
I’ve then added the constraints of ethical considerations on individual choice and
clarified how this might alter the individual utility function. Subsequently, I’ve
argued, the acts individuals take are different with different ethical foundations
and as a consequence the distributive outcome varies with different ethics.
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